https://www.site/2016-03-25/politolog_valeriy_solovey_my_pered_ochen_sereznymi_politicheskimi_peremenami

“After the elections, serious restrictions will be introduced on the exit of citizens from the country”

Political scientist Valery Solovey: we are facing very serious political changes

Historian, political analyst, publicist Valery Solovey published new book- “The ultimate weapon. Fundamentals of psychological warfare and media manipulation.” Why are Russians so easily susceptible to propaganda and how to “decode” them? Based on this, how will soon develop internal political processes? What is the most likely outcome of the election? Will our connections with the outside world change?

“In the manipulation of consciousness, Western democracies, Nazis and Soviets followed the same path”

— Valery Dmitrievich, readers are wondering why you wrote another book on an issue that has already been considered by dozens of other authors? For example, at one time Sergei Kara-Murza’s book “Manipulation of Consciousness” was popular. What errors and shortcomings do you see in it?

— There is not a single worthy book in Russia that talks about propaganda and media manipulation. Not a single one - I emphasize! Kara-Murza’s famous book became so popular only because it was the first in Russia on this topic. But in my own way methodological basis and the content is frankly mediocre. Further, my book, for the first time in literature, combines cognitive psychology with long-known stories about methods, techniques and techniques of propaganda. So far, there has been no such analysis and generalization in the literature on this topic. Meanwhile, cognitive psychology is extremely important because it explains why people are susceptible to propaganda and why propaganda is inevitable. As long as humanity exists, propaganda will exist. And finally, it must be said that I covered the topic of propaganda using current examples that are well understood by readers. The result was a book that was even noted by the leaders of the Russian propaganda machine. As my friends told me, they said about it: “The only worthwhile book in Russian on this topic.” True, they also added: “But it would be better if such a book had not been published at all.” I think this is very high praise. In addition, the first edition was sold out in three weeks. Now the second one is coming out. This is my answer why I wrote this book.

Valery Solovey: “The first thing people pay attention to is the hair. If a person is bald - in the eyes. A man needs to make sure he has good teeth and shoes." from the personal archive of Valery Solovy

— You once said that the concept of the “Overton Window”, which came from the West, reveals the secret mechanisms of loosening social norms, nothing more than a pseudo-theory. Why?

— The “Overton Window” is a propaganda myth. And this concept itself is conspiratorial in nature: they say that there is a group of people who are planning a decades-long strategy to corrupt society. Nothing like this has ever happened anywhere in history and cannot be due to imperfection human nature. I suggest that a person who adheres to the Overton Window concept plan his life for at least a month and live according to his plan. Let's see what happens. Love for this kind of conspiracy theory is typical of those who are not able to manage even their own lives, let alone manage anything at all.

— In our country, the “Overton Window” is remembered when problems with morality are pointed out. Patriarch Kirill said so: “Pedophilia will be legalized after homosexuality.”

— All changes in human history occur spontaneously. This does not mean that there is necessarily some kind of conspiracy behind them and the legalization of homosexual marriage in some European countries will certainly lead to the legalization of pedophilia. Moreover, in one case we are talking about adults who do something voluntarily, and in the other about minors who have parents, and the legalization of pedophilia is possible only through violation of human rights and violence. Therefore, yes, what was anti-norm 100-200 years ago suddenly becomes acceptable today. But this is a natural process, there is no need to see here the “furry paw of the Antichrist” who came to this world to arrange Armageddon through homosexual marriages or something else.

At the same time, I want to say that a reaction can occur in the same way, naturally. I do not at all exclude the possibility that European society may swing back to conservative values. And not because a group of conspirators or Kremlin agents in Europe will be operating somewhere, but simply society will decide that enough is enough, they’ve played enough, they need to think about self-preservation.

“The leaders of the Russian propaganda machine said: “The only worthwhile book in Russian on this topic. But it would be better if it had not been published.”” pycode.ru

— Speaking about the manipulation of consciousness in our country, from what historical period can we count them? Since the time of the Bolsheviks or even earlier?

— If we talk about manipulation in general, then from the moment people learned to speak. But if we are talking about mass manipulation, then from the moment mass communication channels appeared. The starting point of mass deception can be considered the emergence of the media. These are, naturally, newspapers, radio, television. And in this sense, all more or less developed countries followed the same path, that Western democracies - the USA, Great Britain and so on, that Nazi Germany that Soviet Russia. Propaganda occurs in all countries without exception.

Another thing is the quality of propaganda, sophistication, and the presence of pluralism. In the USA, there are media holdings owned by various independent owners. Therefore, different propaganda campaigns balance each other and during election “marathons” citizens have freedom of choice. Well, or the illusion of freedom of choice. That is, where there is pluralism, propaganda is always more subtle and sophisticated.

— In one of your interviews, you said that the BBC is one of the most objective English-language television companies. Do you still think so?

“This company confirms this reputation with its many years of work. All television companies make mistakes, they are all dependent in one way or another, but the BBC suffers from this least of all.

“Russia managed to create the best propaganda machine”

— Is our propaganda more lame and stupid?

- I wouldn't say that. Russia has managed to create, by far, the best propaganda machine. But it is focused exclusively on its own population, since propaganda outside has not been very successful. At least in the European area. They are very involved in our propaganda professional people. These people, in particular, learned a lesson from the information failure of the summer of 2008. Remember the war for South Ossetia, which Russia won militarily, but, by all accounts, lost informationally and propagandaly? Since 2014, we have seen that the propaganda mistakes of 2008 no longer exist.

But we must understand that any propaganda has its limits. Russian propaganda reached its limits at the turn of 2015-16. And you and I will gradually observe its fading. Or, as they often say today, the refrigerator will gradually begin to defeat the TV. I think that at the turn of 2016-17 its strength will weaken quite seriously.

“Today’s diligent resuscitation of the cult of Stalin, for example, casts doubts...

- There is no need to fight this. This will collapse on its own as soon as the regime weakens. Stalin in current realities is nothing more than a propaganda symbol that has no real content or materializing power. Those who call for the return of Stalin in our country believe that he should return only for their neighbors, but not for themselves. When it comes to selfish interests, none of these loud-mouthed Stalinists are ready to sacrifice anything. So the cult of Stalin is a fiction. It’s just that the government is exploiting the Stalin era in order to legitimize some of its repressive measures. But not more. There is a rule for complex social systems. It says that returning to the past, no matter who wants it, is impossible.

RIA Novosti/Evgeniy Biyatov

- But “both old and young” come to Stalin, as if under a spell, with flowers. Can you tell us about the methods of decoding personal and social consciousness?

- Use common sense, judge people by their deeds, read more, or don’t watch TV at all, or no more than 20 minutes a day. If you are called upon to vote for a party that promised something 5-10 years ago and has not done anything by now, do not vote for it under any circumstances. The actions speak for themselves.

— And then, in the future, should employees of propaganda media be lustrated? Are what they commit crimes? Should they be held accountable?

— It is known that the Nuremberg trials equated propaganda with a crime against humanity. Therefore, in a sense, this question can be answered in the affirmative. As for lustration, I do not rule it out, but it is too early to say who this will affect.

“The masses will come out, but this will not lead to civil war and the collapse of the state”

— This year, for the first time in a long time, elections for half of the State Duma will be held in single-mandate constituencies. Can we expect that the election campaign will become more diverse, and that new faces will come to the Duma, revive it, and make it a “place for discussion”?

“Despite the fact that single-mandate constituencies have been returned, I believe that those most dangerous to the preservation of the regime will still simply not be allowed to participate in the elections. Even at the registration stage, candidates go through a “sieve”, which allows us to weed out those disloyal to the regime. And even if some of the undesirables are allowed to participate in the elections, they will experience severe pressure and will generally regret that they went. In the elections they will create the impression of competition, but not the competition itself; everyone will have the same message, just a different style. Therefore, the Duma itself will generally retain a decorative character.

RIA Novosti/Alexander Utkin

- Do you see any real opposition to the regime in the country, in principle, capable of leading the people?

— In Russia there is an opposition that the regime allows to exist. Because any real opposition to them is destroyed, literally and figuratively. But the regime is afraid of even weak opposition.

— In this case, the reader asks, how do you, a specialist in media manipulation, assess the chances of the Putin leadership to formalize and legitimize in the eyes of the population the transformation of Russia into a semi-closed, anti-democratic autocracy similar to the countries of Central Asia?

— Indeed, today the ruling group in Russia is concerned with the question of how to maintain its dominance until 2035-40. At least, I had to hear arguments on this subject from people close to the so-called “elite”. But I believe that in the next couple of years we will see the limits of this mode’s capabilities. I agree that its representatives will try to legitimize their power. But, one way or another, they will soon run out of opportunities for this.

— What about “physical” measures, for example, closing borders?

— After the elections to the State Duma this year, serious restrictions will probably be introduced on the departure of Russian citizens from the country.

— Do you mean the law on exit visas?

- No, it's unlikely. Unspoken recommendations will be given to officials at all levels and their families not to leave the country. And if officials are so seriously infringed upon, they will not tolerate any part of society remaining free in the country. In Russia, if serfdom is introduced, this applies to all classes. This is a historical tradition. According to my information, a tourist tax will be introduced, which will cut off the opportunity for many categories of citizens to travel abroad.

fastpic.ru

— Will this become a factor that, on the contrary, will bring the collapse of the regime closer? After all, this step will affect not only “creaks”, but also ordinary people who previously allowed themselves to relax in decent hotels in Turkey, Egypt, Greece, Tunisia and so on for relatively little money.

— You are right, regimes collapse not because of undermining by the opposition and external enemies. They collapse due to the stupidity of their managers. And sooner or later these nonsense begin to acquire a malignant character. If you look at the history of fallen regimes, you get the impression that those who ruled them seemed to be deliberately leading things to collapse. In general, regarding any political processes in Russia, there is an axiom that the dynamics of the masses are unpredictable. And you can never know in advance what seemingly insignificant things can lead to serious political shifts.

— Another reader’s question is appropriate here: “What scenario is most possible in Russia? The first is that Shoigu (or another conservative) becomes president, punitive and protective measures are tightened, that is, the transition to USSR No. 2. The second is the “Libyan scenario”. The third is the “Rose Revolution” scenario. The fourth is a peaceful evolution towards European democracy. Or the fifth - the collapse of the Russian Federation into many small states as a consequence of the current colonial pseudo-federal system?

— What I definitely don’t expect is the collapse of Russia. When they tell me this, I clearly understand that this is pure trading in fear. I believe that Russia is facing very serious political changes. They will happen in the not so distant medium term and will change our political landscape beyond recognition. These changes will be predominantly peaceful. And then we will move, it is not very clear where. This will depend on the outcome of the changes.

“In the early 1990s, the masses also quite peacefully took to the streets and said: “We can’t live like this anymore.”

- Yes, they will come out. And not for political reasons, but for socio-economic ones. I think that this is very likely, first of all, in major cities. But this will not lead to either civil war or the collapse of the state. I do not believe in this.

RIA Novosti/Alexey Danichev

“But when the protest is peaceful, it is easy to suppress. It’s not for nothing that a person asks you a question about Shoigu and the tightening of punitive and protective measures.

“The government is constantly moving in this direction, but one should not exaggerate the loyalty of the repressive apparatus. She is not at all what she seems. In a critical situation, they simply may not follow orders and move away.

- Not the collapse of the country, but the disappearance of some regions, for example the North Caucasus - is this possible?

— I don’t think that these republics want to leave Russia. In fact, they feel good about it. Where should they go? Without it they will not survive at all. Therefore, they will bargain, trying to impose their terms. But as a result of political changes, I think Moscow’s policy towards these republics will become more balanced and meaningful. Personally, I don’t think that paying huge amounts of money for political loyalty is right. It corrupts. Yes, and it has already corrupted.

“Our politicians use neo-Eurasianism and religion as long as it benefits them”

— Do we still have sane nationalist, or rather national-democratic forces after the Ukrainian events?

— As for organized nationalism, it drags out a miserable existence. He is not allowed to raise his head; many leaders, like Belov, are behind bars. Others, like Demushkin, understand that if they show activity, they will follow Belov. But as for nationalism in general as a kind of social mood, it certainly exists. And these sentiments will soon be in political demand.

— Are you going to revive your national democratic party “New Force” when more favorable times come for public politics?

“It was frozen due to the fact that we were threatened with reprisals.” But in general, I believe that both today and in the future the party format is futile. I think that other formats will be in demand.

RIA Novosti/Yuri Ivanov

— What are the prospects for members of the “January 25 Committee” Igor Strelkov and other “Novorossovites” coming to power?

— There are different people in this organization: nationalists, Soviet “imperials,” and Orthodox monarchists. I don't see that this organization has any prospects. But some, some of its leaders, do. And I do not rule out that 2-3 people from them will be able to play a role in those upcoming political changes that we talked about above.

— In general, do Russians have a chance to self-organize following the example of Israel or Japan, that is, to create a national state? This is a question from one of our readers.

— Of course, there is such a chance, since Russians feel like a single people. Precisely Russians, not Russians. So Russia is in fact, in fact, a national state; all that remains is to formalize the superstructure - the laws - in accordance with this reality and change the policy so that it coincides with the interests of the national majority.

— Do you think Russians have a national identity these days?

- Yes, it exists, it manifests itself in everyday life. Russians are just afraid to talk about it out loud. At least two thirds of Russians feel their national consciousness. Just don’t confuse real Russians and “literary” ones - national costumes, cuisine, instruments, etc. It's just a cheap shot. The nation state is a modern state, not an archaism.

“Moscow’s policy towards these republics will become more balanced. Paying huge amounts of money for political loyalty is wrong.” RIA Novosti/Said Tsarnaev

— The overwhelming majority of the current “Russian nationalists” are Orthodox activists and are convinced that the Russian national state must stand on the foundation of Orthodoxy, without it it cannot be done. Personally, I find this format of a nation state unpleasant. A multinational and cosmopolitan society would be better, but it would be secular and with freedom of ideological, including religious, choice.

— Your remark is appropriate. But, firstly, if you are afraid, then it is better not to do anything at all, not even leave the house. There is always a risk when you do something. And, secondly, the results of this process will depend on those who are at the head of it. Because there is a general sociological pattern: those at the bottom copy those at the top. And if the elite sets clear goals that are understandable and beneficial to the national majority, nothing terrible will happen.

Let's say you say: we want to provide the national majority with affordable housing in order to reverse the demographic situation. The lower classes respond: “Great! We want! This is what a nation state is. But if someone, instead of clear and understandable goals, uses myths like “Stalinism” and says that it is in it that the original Russian character and style of behavior of those in power is concentrated, then this is no longer a national state. This is completely different.

— And “neo-Eurasianism”, which dominates the official ideology ruling group, - this is serious? Do you think they really believe in it or use it like the notorious “Stalinism”?

— To believe or not to believe is not a question in politics. They find it convenient for themselves. This gives some ideological justification for what they are doing. They use it as long as it benefits them. And religion, by the way, too. And if suddenly the weather vane of mood in society swings in the other direction, they will become Russian nationalists or even Muslims. Therefore, you should not focus too much on this issue.

“Russia made no effort to keep Ukraine in its orbit of influence”

— Since we mentioned neo-Eurasianism, we’ll end our conversation with a series of questions about Ukraine: it is perhaps the main victim of the ideology of “neo-Eurasianism”, or the “Russian world”.

One of our readers reminds us that Brzezinski is credited with saying: “Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine, Russia automatically turns into an empire.” That is, I would like to know your opinion: is the “furry paw of American imperialism” visible in the breakdown of relations between Russia and Ukraine?

— I believe that the separation of Russia and Ukraine was a natural process. It started not two years ago, but back in the early 1990s. And even then, many analysts said that Ukraine would inevitably drift towards the West. Moreover, Russia did not make any special efforts to keep Ukraine in its orbit of influence. Or, at least, she did not make the efforts that would be effective. I don’t mean supplying gas at reduced prices, but cultural and intellectual leverage. They weren't used and no one cared. So, I repeat, this is a completely natural process.

And after the annexation of Crimea to Russia and the war in Donbass, the point of no return has been passed. Now Ukraine will definitely never be a fraternal state with Russia. At the same time, I don’t think that the West will accept Ukraine either. Most likely, she will drag out a poor existence. But this does not mean that she will come to bow in Moscow. Anti-Moscow and anti-Russian sentiments will henceforth be the cornerstone for the formation of the national self-awareness of Ukrainians. Here the question can be closed.

RIA Novosti/Andrey Stenin

— So, Russia will never be an empire again?

— Well, this was clear even in the 1990s, and not only in connection with Brzezinski’s geopolitical views. And now we find ourselves at the point of post-Soviet existence. Or rather, we are stuck there and are not developing anywhere. True, this inertia has already exhausted itself. Therefore, political changes are inevitable.

— Is there an opportunity in the future to resolve the “Crimean issue” in a compromise in order to get rid of sanctions?

“I think there is a chance to freeze this problem and ensure de facto recognition of Crimea. As for the Crimean Tatars, there are not very many of them. And they can be offered a formula based on which they would understand that it is better to live in peace. If they understand that there is no other alternative for them, they will make peace. This is quite enough. De jure recognition of Crimea as Russian territory depends on the position of Ukraine. If we talk about sanctions against Russia, then there are those imposed for Crimea, and others for Donbass. And these are different sanctions. And the sanctions for Crimea are far from the most sensitive.

— What, in your opinion, awaits Ukraine in general and Donbass in particular?

— The fate of Ukraine depends on the quality of its elite. If an elite appears there, capable of leading the country onto new paths of development, then everything will be fine. I don't think it will break up or become a federation. But, one way or another, he will remain the “sick man of Europe.”

The fate of Donbass is terrible. In any situation, it is doomed to be a kind of “black hole” on the geopolitical map. Most likely, it will turn out to be a pacified territory, but de facto neither as part of Ukraine nor as part of Russia. This will be a region where crime, corruption, and economic decline will reign - a kind of European Somalia. There is no point in modernizing anything there, because no one really needs Donbass. For Ukraine and Russia, this is a stone on their feet. But people get used to everything. I have friends and relatives who live there, have already adapted to this lifestyle and don’t want to leave.

RIA Novosti/Dan Levy

Reference

Valery Solovey was born in 1960. After graduating from the Faculty of History of Moscow State University, he worked at the Academy of Sciences and the Gorbachev Foundation. Completed an internship at the London School of Economics and political sciences. Doctor of Historical Sciences (dissertation topic - “The Russian Question” and its influence on the internal and foreign policy Russia"). Currently, he is a professor at MGIMO, head of the department of public relations, and author of a course of lectures on the manipulation of public consciousness.

Valery Solovey: by 2024 there will be 15-20 regions in Russia and state ideology

Political scientist, MGIMO professor Valery Solovey expressed his opinion regarding rumors about imminent constitutional reform in Russia.

The other day, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court, Valery Zorkin, spoke about the need to change the Constitution of the country.

According to Professor Solovy, by 2024 in Russia the number of federal subjects will be reduced through unification and state ideology will be introduced.

Valery Solovey:

I have already written and spoken on this topic, and I would be happy to repeat it.

1. Preparation constitutional reform, or rather cardinal changes in wide range constitutional laws was launched in the fall of 2017.

2. Changes were developed in the following areas:

a) the formation of a new configuration of state power and management;

b) a radical reduction in the number of subjects of the federation (to 15-20) by merging them for the purpose of ease of administration, equalizing levels of development and neutralizing ethnic separatist tendencies;

c) decisive amendments to the laws on elections and political parties (not at all in the sense of liberalization);

d) introduction of state ideology.
Well, one more thing.

3. Initially, it was not clear which of the changes and in what volume would be given the green light, and which would not.

But in any case, they were not supposed to be implemented all at the same time due to the predicted strong negative reaction.

4. Sine qua non - reconfiguration of state power and management, which should provide an institutional and legal framework for the transit of the system.

There are also several options here.

From the well-known model with the establishment of the State Council as an analogue of the Politburo and the reduction of the role of the president to representative and symbolic functions to, on the contrary, the strengthening and expansion of presidential powers and the establishment of the post of vice president. (There are several other options.)

5. The transit of the system should be completed before 2024 in order to take external and internal enemies by surprise. It was assumed that 2020-2021 could be decisive.

6. There is only one reason why these deadlines could be shifted downwards.

And this reason has nothing to do with politics and declining ratings. The situation is assessed as concerning, but not critical and under control.

7. And, moreover, there was no talk of any early elections and there could not be any talk. A fundamental change in the organization of state power and management is not being carried out in order to hold elections and subject the system to extreme stress.

8. Among the key beneficiaries of the reform, the authorities name three people who are already among the top ten elite in terms of their political and bureaucratic weight.

On the air of the radio station “Echo of Moscow” is Valery Solovey, political scientist, professor at MGIMO.

The broadcast is hosted by Stanislav Kryuchkov and Andrey Yezhov.

S. Kryuchkov: 15 hours 6 minutes in the Russian capital. This is “Personally Yours”. The program will be hosted by Andrey Ezhov and Stanislav Kryuchkov. And with us today is political scientist, MGIMO professor Valery Solovey. Valery, hello.

V. Solovey: Good afternoon, gentlemen.

S. Kryuchkov: We remind you about our on-air coordinates. You can write to us via SMS +7 985 970-45-45, asking questions to our guest, messages broadcast on the website, and in the Youtube chat where the broadcast is taking place, on Twitter your questions, remarks, comments for the guest.

A. Ezhov: I remind you of the vyzvon account for those who may not remember. We also have a chat in Telegram in experimental mode, join, add and send your questions, remarks and comments there. We have thousands of opportunities to contact our studio and ask a question to political scientist Valery Solovy, who will be with us and with you today in the next hour.

V. Solovey: These elections are considered epochal, historical

Here the Kremlin decided to increase turnout in the presidential elections, quite expectedly, in my opinion, by turning voting into a holiday, organizing performances by creative groups, a consumer goods fair, and even selling food. How justified is this calculation of the Presidential Administration? The Russians will really fall for this, in conditions where, I think, everyone can guess how these elections will end and the result is predetermined. Perhaps this will somehow work for some regions, but Moscow is unlikely.

V. Solovey: You very correctly noted that for some regions this may be very important. The fact is that in Russia there are not enough holidays and, frankly speaking, we live in a northern country and a rather depressive one, especially in winter and, in fact, in spring, most of spring and autumn too.

S. Kryuchkov: Sometimes in the summer.

V. Solovey: Sometimes it happens when summer is depressive. That's why people in Russia love free holidays. Especially in the provinces. This is the first one. The second is the revival of the Soviet tradition, which I remember, fortunately you don’t, but now you will have a chance to see how this happened at a time when they really tried to turn the elections into a holiday, to somehow attract people. I think for a certain part it will work. People will have the opportunity to come listen to music, performances by amateur groups and, most importantly, buy something at a discount: even some baked goods, some confectionery. This can attract some voters.

S. Kryuchkov: What is this planning connected with? What is the fundamental difference from latest story with municipal elections, when we heard over and over again about the notorious “drying of turnout.” Back then they tried to reduce turnout, but now they are stimulating it.

V. Solovey: Because these elections are considered epochal, historical. Because this is the last election, as expected, that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin will go to and we need to show him, the city and the world that his support is significant. Therefore, this notorious figure of 70% appeared, 70% turnout and 70% of votes cast for him. As you know, the Presidential Administration has rejected these figures several times, saying that these are all fictions and that there are no plans, even indicative ones.

But, in fact, political competition has already unfolded in the regions, and not at all in regions far from Moscow, but, in particular, in the Moscow region, in order to not only meet these indicators, but even exceed them. And I can say that they are preparing for this carefully. But there is one rule or strict recommendation that will have to be followed - you cannot create the impression among people in large cities, in cities with over a million people, and in Moscow and St. Petersburg, first of all, that the elections were held dishonestly. That is, there should be no noticeable falsifications at polling stations, in order to avoid provoking political protests. These are the things our political authorities will keep an eye on.

What happens there in more remote places with the so-called directed or controlled voting and with the predominant administrative resource is not discussed. Here are Moscow, St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg, several other cities - here they will try to keep everything clean. But you know very well how to ensure attendance. How many hundreds of thousands of municipal and federal employees live in Moscow.

A. Ezhov: You said about the Moscow region, there already in Khimki, in my opinion, kindergarten teachers were mobilized with a very psychedelic NRZB.

V. Solovey: Yes, I’ll see what you mean. But, in fact, this is a blatant and ridiculous manifestation. And the work is carried out very carefully and quite technologically. And I have no doubt that these goals, which are not proclaimed, which are abandoned, will in fact be achieved.

A. Ezhov: But in this story with the lack of holidays in Russia, Misha from Saratov partly agrees, he says: “It’s unlikely that anyone will go for food….

V. Solovey: The atmosphere, yes...

A. Ezhov: ...or an additional day off. These loyal masses will rejoice accordingly.”

V. Solovey: They can, yes.

A. Yezhov: You wrote the other day that the feeling of hopelessness in connection with the approaching 4th or 5th, variously called, Putin’s term, without reason, we have entered an era, a period of serious changes. What will they be like? Is the withdrawal of troops from Syria a start, can this be considered a harbinger of change, or did you have a different kind of change in mind?

V. Solovey: The withdrawal of troops from Syria is important element specifically the electoral campaign, because Putin is suited to the new mandate, presumably the final one, and it shows that the operation was completed successfully. Just like Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin in 1996, before the presidential elections, signed a Decree on the armor of a tank on the completion of the anti-terrorist operation in Chechnya. So, everything is natural.

But, if we started talking about Syria at your suggestion, then I want to tell you that here, in addition to political aspect, there is also a military-technical one. Russia does not have enough resources to participate in several local wars at the same time, and since now our private military companies are already participating in the conflict in Libya, well, they are engaged in peaceful activities there, that is, removing minefields, but they are already participating in Sudan and, most likely, will participate in Yemen, then, naturally, it is necessary to cut down somewhere in order to be transferred somewhere. There are few resources. Russia is a poor country, which spends a significant part of its budget on defense and law enforcement, in quotes law enforcement.

V. Solovey: The withdrawal of troops from Syria is an important element of the election campaign

A. Yezhov: This military expansion into Africa that you are talking about, theoretically, if it is full-scale, how media-wise it will correspond to what we saw in Syria, because with Syria it is clear.

V. Solovey: Of course, it will not be full-scale, because there are still not enough resources, and it will be hidden, because it is very difficult. Even with Syria, it was extremely difficult to explain to our society what we were doing there and why.

A. Ezhov: Not everyone can find it on the map.

V. Solovey: And what can we say about Sudan? They still tried to somehow attract Syria to our Orthodoxy. It is clear that these were just far-fetched connections. But you will not be able to attract Sudan or Yemen to Russian interests. For society I mean.

S. Kryuchkov: But nevertheless, leaving this seemingly media-cultivated Syrian garden in favor of unknown African countries...

V. Solovey: And this will be kept silent. It’s one thing that Russia may have some interests there, including one of the interests that is most likely not economic, although experts on the Internet will explain to us what important geopolitical interests there are. No, it's very simple logic. As a rule, we try to insert a fuse into the Americans and the West in general wherever we can. The President of Sudan complained that he was being pressured, we - okay, why not help. And he needs this in order to negotiate more successfully with the United States, among other things.

S. Kryuchkov: Regarding the final term, returning to the elections, the 4th, 5th, as you say, Putin, what gives reason to assume that this will be exactly the case? This is the aesthetics of supplication that was demonstrated to us at GAZ, when Putin was moving forward, when the senior site foreman Artem Baranov was shouting... What does this aesthetics testify to?

A. Ezhov: Stylistically, in my opinion, it simply looked Kafkaesque.

V. Solovey: I have a little more experience, this in this case may be some kind of drawback. I can say that all this reminds me of the Chernenko era. The end of the Soviet era. There was a widespread feeling then that it had run its course. And now there is this feeling of exhaustion, by the way, I am not comparing Putin with Chernenko in any sense, these are completely different people both in health and in psychotype, but there is a feeling of exhaustion of the historical era, and it has both a mass character and an elite character. Everyone understands that almost 20 years have ended and we must move on to some new quality. But no one has any idea about this new quality or the paths of transition.

Of course, the Presidential Administration is preparing, developing some options, including constitutional reform, but no one knows how this will go. No one even knows where to move, but everyone has a feeling that was formulated during the years of Perestroika and was very popular - this is not how you can live. The era is over. This is now widespread. The overwhelming majority of society wants changes, and the elite, even if they did not want changes, they understand that they are already overdue and they are inevitable.

A. Ezhov: You say that we are entering a period of serious changes after March 18th. And what will be, tritely, the three main steps that we will see? It is clear that forecasts are a thankless task...

V. Solovey: Formation of a government, of course. A government will be formed in May.

A. Yezhov: After the inauguration.

V. Solovey: Yes. And with a high probability, the old prime minister may remain there, but a new person may also come.

S. Kryuchkov: What surprises can await us?

V. Solovey: One of the surprises may be related, I am participating, in particular, now in the election campaign at Mr. Titov’s headquarters, one of the surprises may be related to his successful performance. If he campaigns and performs successfully, it could give him a future beyond the electoral horizon. But we are still in the subjunctive mood.

As for the post of prime minister, it is now believed that Dmitry Anatolyevich should remain. But this does not mean that this will happen, since life is changeable, Vladimir Vladimirovich’s mood and our idea of ​​his plans, his future can also change. Several people are believed to have received hints about the possibility of taking over as prime minister. Or they took it as hints. And, as you know, Sergei Semenovich Sobyanin even publicly renounced this high honor, saying that Moscow is his favorite city and it is much more important than Russia. A real man should be concerned with Moscow, not Russia.

S. Kryuchkov: Returning to what you were talking about - the feeling of the exhaustion of the era - is this what the media will work with in Putin’s next term? Because, in my opinion, there was such a feeling during the wave of protests at the turn of the 11th and 12th years, but it was overcome.

V. Solovey: It was overcome largely thanks to Crimea. Because if there had been no Crimea, this feeling of exhaustion would have come much earlier. Because Crimea was a powerful vaccine that was able to temporarily, not forever and even for a short time, reverse the psychological and sociocultural situation. And now the media, after March 18, will face a fundamentally unsolvable task, because they will need to create a positive image of the future, because they can no longer speculate on Ukraine, on Syria, on enemies. People don't care about this anymore. This is clear from surveys. They are interested in their own future here and now in a country called Russia.

What can the media offer? If there is a global discrepancy between the picture they are trying to paint and reality, then this will cause both Soviet time growing aggression. Our society is very aggressive, extremely so. It's angry, partly it's demoralized, but partly it's very angry. A lot of hatred and anger have accumulated in him, and all this can break through.

The main demand in Russia now, the main deficit is not even a shortage of money, it is a deficit of perspective and a deficit of understanding of the future. Sociology generally shows this. And this, I think, shows your personal feeling. People can't plan their own life, unable. This is what you have to work with. But in order to give the answer that the media give to society, they must first receive an answer from the supreme power. What is the supreme power planning? It's not clear yet.

A. Ezhov: Based on the expectation better life After the formation of the government, we should expect some loud statements, some next national projects.

V. Solovey: I think that three reforms will be launched, they are being prepared. This is a reform of government, this is a reform of the legal system and what is called economic reform. But all these reforms will be, as I imagine, of a pronounced technocratic nature, that is, the goal of legal reform is not to create an independent court, but to ensure that the court works quickly. In the same way, the goal of economic reform is not to free up small and medium-sized businesses, to reduce taxes - no, to increase labor productivity.

There is such a good historical analogy, this is exactly where Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev started, in 85-56 he tried to accelerate, that is, using the resources of the socialist model, to use its advantages to accelerate economic growth. Here is the idea of ​​increasing labor productivity, and the program was developed by Mr. Oreshkin; it is typologically similar to the idea of ​​Gorbachev’s acceleration. Please note that these are technocratic reforms. And in the reform of public administration, in the criteria, the word “democracy” is not there at all, simply not. As I know. Maybe it will appear in the final version.

But what is most curious is when these reforms, and they must be carried out, because somehow we need to respond to these mass expectations that we just talked about, that people want clarity and they want something positive. As soon as these reforms begin to be carried out, they will be carried out with the ugliness inherent in Russia and on a colossal scale, this could provoke deterioration, you know, that’s how it is here. And therefore, some of the most experienced officials say: “Listen, we have developed a wonderful project with you, wonderful, but don’t you think that if we start doing something, it won’t get worse.” “Yes, yes,” they say, “but we can’t leave the state of things as they are, everyone is already tired of it. People want some kind of at least external movement.” And now you and I find ourselves in such an unpleasant situation, unpleasant for everyone - for society, for the elites, and for the supreme power too. What not to do is impossible and to do is dangerous.

A. Yezhov: According to your words, by the way, Putin has already allegedly won the upcoming campaign through propaganda by putting forward an initiative to provide monetary incentives for the birth of first-born children. Is this really a strong move? Money in general is not the most prohibitive.

V. Solovey: Firstly, this is a lot of money for Russian province, 10.5 thousand rubles on average per month for a newborn is very significant with very low salaries, this benefit will be comparable to the salary.

A. Yezhov: But not everyone will get it.

V. Solovey: Of course. But it is not important. The propaganda potential will begin to be realized only after the New Year. Can you imagine what kind of reports our television media will send to the media space, here is a happy family, the whole country will see it. No one will think about the details, in which, as usual, lies the devil that this is not for everyone, there are a number of restrictions. Everyone will be: “Great, this has never happened before.” And this is the image of the future. This is a substitute, that is, a replacement, in fact, for the future. When you start stimulating the birth rate, we look to the future. It will be presented in this way, and I am sure that the propaganda potential of this bill is underestimated, the propaganda around it will be extremely successful. Because, from the point of view of PR, I still teach PR, the best speculation is speculation on children. But also on cats.

A. Ezhov: I see, it’s an eternal topic. There are still three months until the elections...

V. Solovey: Well, what three months, what are you talking about...

A. Ezhov: Actually, I mean calendar ones.

V. Solovey: Oh, yes. Chronologically yes.

V. Solovey: Russia does not have enough resources to participate in several local wars at the same time

A. Yezhov: The prospect of a new wave of protests due to the fact that Alexey Navalny has already stated that the campaign is not so much disobedience, but recognition of these elections as illegitimate if he is not registered, it is clear that most likely he will not be registered , should we expect some kind of development here?

V. Solovey: I think that after January 10, when it becomes finally clear that Alexei Navalny will not be able to participate in the elections and the New Year holidays will end, he will have to go to some kind of protest. That is, in the language of psychotherapy, close the gestalt. Otherwise, this whole story with signature verification and the like will be meaningless. But well, you went there, spoke at rallies, you have to react somehow. This will be the first step, which means protests. I don’t know how large-scale and successful they will be, I’m not sure. Because successful actions are those that, even if they do not look spontaneous, are actually carefully prepared. This is the first one. And second, yes, he will call for a boycott, of course, a boycott of the elections after these protests. But I don't believe the boycott will be successful.

A. Ezhov: Against this background, are you following Sobchak’s campaign? I see that the girl has not left the federal channels, just a few hours ago.

V. Solovey: Crimea was a powerful vaccine that was able to temporarily reverse the psychological and sociocultural situation

V. Solovey: She stays on federal channels precisely because she compensates Navalny. She must appear in the federal public media space as a replacement for Alexei Navalny; this, firstly, is a rather obvious political technology move, but generally accurate. And she even received carte blanche, since Navalny’s popularity is not declining as quickly as the Presidential Administration would like. This is the first one. And secondly, she must win over to her side some of those who would participate in the boycott of the elections and support Navalny’s protest. Young people who, as far as I know, according to sociology, in the absence of Navalny, are ready to vote for Sobchak.

S. Kryuchkov: Titov, whose headquarters you came to, is an alternative candidate from the liberals for people over 40. That is, not for young people.

V. Solovey: Yes, you are trying to complete this scheme that I started. No, he still targets a different audience, I think the 25+ audience.

S. Kryuchkov: Websites write: “Valery Solovey came to Titov’s headquarters in order to supervise ideological issues.” What does it mean? What does it mean to oversee ideology at a businessman’s headquarters?

V. Solovey: Of course, it sounds a little Soviet, but, in fact, this is a very interesting task. I don’t know whether it will be fully implemented, since it is very difficult in terms of technology and technical skills. Both Titov and, in general, the Party of Growth, of which he is the leader, adheres to the position of right-wing liberalism, which is very honorable and effective, at least in the world of ideology, but in Russia it was not possible to adapt it to our soil. I'll explain it to you, let's just use our fingers. In our country there are 18 million self-employed people, several million small and medium-sized businessmen, the views of these people are economic, not political, they are absolutely liberal views, not just liberal - libertarian. They want low taxes, they don't want to deal with the state, which you know very well, this is ready ground for the liberal party. But we need to find an approach to them, we need to find a message to which they would be sensitive.

S. Kryuchkov: This is aimed at what future?

V. Solovey: This is a long-term goal. Because when one election ends, another will begin. I can say that the Party of Growth is already preparing for regional elections, right now.

S. Kryuchkov: So we are talking about party history, not about Titov’s individual history?

V. Solovey: No, individual and party. In this case they are inextricably linked. But this is the task of adapting ideology. We'll see what happens.

A. Ezhov: Many of our listeners, who write SMS messages to the number +7 985 970-45-45 and use the vyzvon Twitter account, do not agree with you on this, regarding expectations of changes in society: “Where Valery Solovey saw an angry society, maybe at a gas plant, where people were jubilant?” Well, this is the kind of message. This is a story that rather concerns large cities or...

V. Solovey: Now it is believed that Dmitry Anatolyevich should stay.

V. Solovey: No, this story concerns everyone in Russia, they just react differently. You can be extremely angry and, as very often happens in Russia, go drinking vodka, punch your neighbor in the face, or quarrel. Aggression can spread like this. As for the GAZ plant, we know what kind of audience there was and who proposed it to Vladimir Vladimirovich, it was not a worker after all, so what? Even if they had to bring specially trained extras there, you can imagine how afraid the really minded people would be.

A. Ezhov: We spent almost half of the first program talking about the electoral prospects of Vladimir Putin, first of all, but Elena Ivankovskaya in a Youtube chat asks a perhaps partly naive question: “Is another scenario possible other than the election of Putin? Nobody expected Trump to win, but he won. Or does this not work in our reality?”

V. Solovey: This is not such a naive question. This is one of the reasons, perhaps the main one, why Alexei Navalny will not be allowed to participate in the elections. Not because he might win, but because his participation itself would create entirely unanticipated political dynamics. That is, this would not be the Trump effect or the Brexit effect as in the UK, but the very participation of an alternative candidate with an alternative program speaking on central television channels could cause a completely unforeseen effect. He is trying to avoid this effect, because in Russia, and this applies not only to presidential elections, the authorities want to control everything, they are afraid of the unexpected, they are afraid of those areas that are beyond their control. Notice how she tries to take control of everyday life, even intimate life, invades all spheres of culture, art, not to mention business. She is fundamentally afraid of everything that is out of her control. Because, from her point of view, there is a threat there. You know how children are afraid of the dark, because someone is hiding in the dark. Dentists are acceptable. Likewise, the government is afraid of everything that is outside its control. At least the government groups.

S. Kryuchkov: Substantially afraid of what goes beyond its boundaries, but within itself. Let's say you note that Prime Minister Medvedev mentioned that he does not see himself as president in the current election season.

V. Solovey: This could be either a subtle game on the part of Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev, that’s what I don’t really believe, or simply an inability to accurately formulate his thought. Although, if they helped him prepare answers to these questions, then perhaps this is a subtle, far-reaching hint, but the fact is that it is necessary to calculate the public reaction, our public does not perceive, and the Western public, I can say with complete certainty, that comes from the lips of our prime minister as a strategic and finely thought out game.

A. Ezhov: Let's talk a little about the Moscow events.

V. Solovey: What’s going on?

A. Yezhov: Look what’s happening. The action of the revolutionary communist youth union took place here with the posting of offensive stickers in Moscow on Alexander Solzhenitsyn Street, they call the writer a literary Vlasovite. And literally the day before at Artdocfest there was an attack by SERB activists. The fact that law enforcement agencies are reacting to this very calmly is this carte blanche?

V. Solovey: Why is it calm? They also opened a criminal case against these SERB activists.

A. Ezhov: Yes, but at the same time there is a curator for SERB activists at Center E and his name is known.

V. Solovey: Yes, I understand. In general, the government uses non-conventional means, let’s call it such a beautiful term, in order to maintain control. Since you cannot use law enforcement agencies to openly violate the Constitution, although in our country these boundaries are already blurred, you are trying to “mobilize” supposedly public activists, who are actually controlled by you, to imitate public reaction. And this is a very good means of control for the time being, until these tools, as was the case with the campaign against Matilda, begin to get out of your control. This is the first one.

And secondly, there is always a danger here, that when you limit your own monopoly on violence, violence in a figurative sense, in favor of some groups you alienate it, sacrifice it, then it begins to erode. And then don’t be surprised that in a critical situation a mass of people will suddenly appear, as was the case in Donbass, who will say: “Yes, we ourselves will now restore order, we will now create squads, self-defense units, people’s squads for the inculcation of morality, people’s squads for defense of liberalism, whatever. And we will take action ourselves.” We must then be prepared for this; this is an inevitable consequence of the policy of such encouragement of unauthorized activity that imitates public activity.

V. Solovey: Igor Ivanovich Sechin cannot curb his appetites

S. Kryuchkov: Are those who play this game and send out such signals ready for the return of this wave?

V. Solovey: They are confident that they are in control of the situation. This is an eternal misconception, similar to the story of Papa Carlo. Remember, he made a beautiful boy out of a log and equipped him for school, and where did the boy go, he sold everything and went to the circus. It’s the same with these golems, into which they breathed life and let them go. But they will turn against them. But the main thing is that people look: “Listen, why don’t we have the right...” This idea of ​​legitimizing violence will certainly be in the public consciousness, it is already there.

And the aggression that we talked about in the first part is dispersed, widespread, when you hit your neighbor in the face after drinking a glass of vodka, it may well be directed against the boss, against the director of the DEZ, against the manager, against the owner of the enterprise. It's all the same as in '17. This can turn around instantly, I emphasize, historically instantly, within literally a few weeks. As soon as the appearance of power collapses or weakens, suddenly people will understand: “Look, the police are only protecting themselves, they are afraid of us. Let me go get social justice. I will take revenge on those who, from my point of view, offended me.”

A. Ezhov: Our viewer Alexey Frolov, who is watching us Youtube channel“Echo of Moscow” still won’t calm down on the topic of a worker from the GAZ plant: “Who did he turn out to be, a FSO major?”

V. Solovey: Well, he wasn’t a worker, that’s for sure.

A. Ezhov: I think Alexey Frolov was satisfied with the answer.

S. Kryuchkov: I would not leave the topic with Vladimir Vladimirovich, even if he is our hero...

V. Nightingale: He will not leave us.

S. Kryuchkov: He will hold a press conference this week, followed by the United Russia Congress. In addition to the listed topics, the declared victory and the withdrawal of troops from Syria, demographic history, what else will become such features?

V. Solovey: At the beginning of next year, his blitz visits to the regions will be about responding to complaints. This is a direct connection between the king and the people. People hit it with their heads and say that there is a landfill there or the water flowing is rusty.

A. Yezhov: You can buy a dress for a girl, you can give a puppy.

V. Solovey: Yes, yes. These scenarios have already been written, the only question is in which regions they will be. And he immediately solves the problem. Since we cannot solve the social problems of society, well, we lack resources, strength, and desire, but we can create the impression that the problems are being solved as a whole by solving some specific, local issues. And it always works very well as a propaganda tool, like a television picture. The boyars on the side, why didn’t they overlook it, they really won’t impale them, although the people would warmly welcome it, the boyars would be impaled or thrown to the archers for punishment. But solving someone’s private problem – yes.

A. Ezhov: As for media money, after this whole story with Russia’s exclusion from the Olympics, the Kremlin’s reaction, it seemed to me, was quite mild. The hysteria on state channels and in talk shows continued, but Putin himself spoke rather restrainedly, this was not a ready decision on participation or non-participation or is this part...

V. Solovey: It seems to me that the decision was ready, everything was thought out, because it was more or less clear where things were going, the scenarios were thought out and they decided to choose, firstly, the one that minimizes losses, and secondly, there was The compensator is Vladimir Vladimirovich’s announcement that he is going to the polls. I think I initially assumed that he would report it a little later, but it compensated very well, this classic displacement of unwanted news, dangerous news, by stronger news.

S. Kryuchkov: But there is also a parallel story, if we announce a boycott, then we will miss the next two Olympics during Putin’s tenure.

V. Solovey: Sobchak does not leave federal channels precisely because she compensates Navalny

V. Solovey: Naturally. And now you can use very moderate anti-Westernism - they are trying to spoil us with all their might, but despite this, we behave with dignity and win victories.

A. Ezhov: Regarding anti-Westernism. Official representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova demonstrated new lexical heights. She accused Western partners of wanting to “capitalize on our military achievements.” It seems to me, or for a high official of the foreign policy department, by the way, you teach at MGIMO, is this a normal choice of terminology? How do you think? Or does everything fit the context?

V. Solovey: Since I am at MGIMO, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I never comment official statements Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This is corporate ethics. I think you will understand this.

S. Kryuchkov: Let's return to the neutral flag and the Olympics in South Korea. This will happen on the eve of the presidential elections. Will it affect the internal agenda? After all, it’s a win-win option, look, under a neutral flag they tore everyone apart - they proved that the decision was the right one, they lost - and under a neutral flag everything went through.

V. Solovey: I think that, as usual, there will be victories. And we have candidates who are capable of winning, these victories will be brightly highlighted, they will create a very good background. Then the president will meet the winners, treat them kindly, and reward them. And those who do not win, you can forget about them and say: “They fought with dignity, but everything was against them.” Remember how against our players the green lawn, fine weather, the support of the stands, in general, everything is against us. Everything will turn out to be against the losing Olympians.

V. Solovey: Russia’s main deficit is a lack of perspective and understanding of the future

A. Ezhov: Listener from Krasnodar region asks: “Human rights activist Lyudmila Alekseeva was given a state award - is this a new flirtation, democracy 5.0?”, as an unsubscribed listener writes. Subscribe.

V. Solovey: This is an attempt by part of the Russian leadership to maintain a certain balance and pursue a pragmatic policy. That is, there are quite a few people who oversee internal policy, information policy, who are all stupid cruelty, horror stories, they do not lead to anything good. That they only turn society away from power, they set up a negative attitude among the intelligentsia, a significant part of which is liberal, so it is better to pursue a pragmatic policy, there is no need to intimidate unnecessarily, there is no point, everything is already in order, everything is under control. This is the position of conditionally pragmatists, realists. And there is another group that says: “No, no, guys, what are you talking about. God forbid you give them a little slack, they will immediately come out. Do you remember how it was in 89-91? Therefore, under no circumstances.” This is the group that was traumatized in August 1991 and is still experiencing the consequences of that birth trauma for itself. This group is very influential. So different groups have different positions, but I wouldn't say it's a clever game, subtle. Nothing like this. Some say: “You don’t need to do this.” Others: “No, no. We’d better do this to avoid it.”

A. Yezhov: Regarding the situation around Suleiman Kerimov, who was detained in France. What do you think of this whole story? And you wrote that a similar fate could probably await other Russian officials after February.

V. Solovey: That’s why other Russian officials will not go to celebrate New Year outside the Russian Federation.

A. Yezhov: And to friendly countries?

V. Nightingale: Friendly countries– this is China, Kyrgyzstan, the Maldives, by the way, are among these countries. The Maldives is wonderful, but you understand that you cannot have an estate in the Maldives, and you will not have vineyards there. Estates and vineyards elsewhere. For at least six months no one will bother going abroad now.

A. Ezhov: That is, such a serious story?

V. Solovey: It’s not even a matter of whether it’s an accident or a trend. This is fear. Really scared. If Matvienko stated several times: “We accept you, but the Federation Council is like the possible beginning of political purges, a political witch hunt.” How gracefully she phrased it. This is a mass mood. And the recommendation was repeated that gentlemen, you need to choose: you are either loyal to the countries where your families, your relatives live, where your real estate is, or you are loyal to Russia. Choose.

A. Ezhov: Matvienko and his delegation are going to the DPRK, I don’t know.

V. Solovey: With the delegation, with the delegation.

A. Ezhov: I’m not hinting at anything.

V. Solovey: Do you think there will be no extradition from the DPRK? No, stop.

A. Ezhov: Well, maybe the poster will be torn down.

V. Solovey: No, stop.

V. Solovey: In the public administration reform, in the criteria, the word “democracy” is not there at all

S. Kryuchkov: Let's talk about those who may potentially have, yes, most likely, have these estates and vineyards in the West. The litigation between Rosneft and AFK Sistema will not go away. This ping-pong, which continues against the background of the launched election campaign, of persons associated with the name of the president and the main candidate, what does it indicate? Either Rosneft again for 131 billion, then AFK in return...

V. Solovey: What to do with AFK when they are pressing you in the corner and want to ruin you. It’s clear that Igor Ivanovich Sechin needs money, but so what, many people need money. What do you want, take everything? Therefore, the only way for AFK now is to roll out a counter-risk with a huge amount in order to attract public attention. Because AFK’s PR people, I give it their due, are quite professional people, they understand perfectly well that the more noise, the less the Kremlin likes it. The Kremlin, through the mouth of the president, said: “Well, you will come to an agreement in the end.” Igor Ivanovich Sechin cannot moderate his appetites.

But the president doesn’t like all these stories. He doesn't like them because they attract unwanted attention from, well, Russian society may not really interest him, from the West. Because it really affects the investment climate. This is how people will look: “Listen, they can ruin AFK there, this is the largest non-resource corporation in Russia, they can ruin you. You call for development and investment in the digital economy. So you can ruin any non-resource corporation because someone wanted it.” These are all very bad reputation stories.

A. Ezhov: Since we remembered Igor Ivanovich Sechin, a few words about Ulyukaev. The former minister made his final speech last week. What kind of sentence do you expect, conditional, real, will any scheme be used?

V. Solovey: I assumed that his article would be reclassified so that he could get out and receive a suspended sentence. Let's see, because Igor Ivanovich Sechin was still able, despite the unfavorable course of the process for himself, unfavorable means public. Because he was absolutely sure that the trial would take place privately, not in the light of Jupiter and the spotlight. But he still managed to achieve a fighting draw, Igor Ivanovich. We'll see, the outcome of the trial will tell.

S. Kryuchkov: What if this is used as some kind of PR effect? Let’s say they give a conditional “bribe-taker” a sentence, introduce some error into the sentence, then, after the election fanfare has died down, they go through the appeal process and quietly release him.

V. Solovey: Such a scenario is also possible, let’s see. You see how Russia is structured. Here, in fact, there is elite pluralism, the president is in the role of referee, I am the heavyweights in the ring.

A. Ezhov: Political scientist, MGIMO professor Valery Solovey was today a guest of the “Personally Yours” program. Thank you for watching and listening.

V. Solovey: Thank you.

A. Ezhov: We’ll be back in just over 10 minutes in the “Day Spread” program. This is Stas Kryuchkov, Andrey Yezhov. Join us.

There is a bright palette in the assessments of the figure of political scientist Valery Solovy - he is a spy, a Russian nationalist, and a specialist in indoctrination. The incredible accuracy of his forecasts of certain events in the life of the country, willingly or unwillingly, evokes the idea that the professor has his own network of informants in the vertical of power. The general public recognized Valery Solovy after resonant performances on Manezhnaya Square in December 2010 and on the RBC TV channel.

Childhood and youth

The details of the political scientist’s life available in the sources are not rich in facts. Valery Dmitrievich Solovey was born on August 19, 1960 in the Lugansk region of Ukraine, in a city with a promising name - Happiness. There is no information about Nightingale’s childhood.

After high school Valery became a student at the Faculty of History of Moscow state university. After graduating from university in 1983, he worked for ten years at the Institute of History of the USSR of the Academy of Sciences. In 1987, he successfully defended his dissertation for the degree of Candidate of Historical Sciences.

Valery Solovy’s further work biography continued at the international foundation for socio-economic and political science research “Gorbachev Foundation”. According to some reports, Solovey worked at the fund until 2008. During this time, he prepared several reports for international organizations, including the UN, was a visiting researcher at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and defended his doctoral dissertation.

By the way, some observers and political scientists reproach Valery for his connections with the foundation and the London School of Economics, believing that both of these institutions a priori cannot be carriers of the ideas of creating a strong Russian state. Simultaneously with his work in these organizations, Valery Solovey held a position on the editorial board and wrote articles in the magazine “Free Thought”.

Since 2009, the political scientist has been a member of the Expert Council of the international analytical journal Geopolitika. The magazine promotes the ideas of preserving Russian identity, statehood, and spreading the Russian language and culture. Famous media personalities work in the editorial office - Oleg Poptsov, Anatoly Gromyko, Giulietto Chiesa. In addition, Valery Solovey heads the Department of Advertising and Public Relations at MGIMO University.

Science and social activities

In 2012, Professor Solovey made an attempt to make himself known more loudly in the political arena by creating and leading the New Force party, which he announced in January of the same year on the Ekho Moskvy radio station. Nationalism, according to the professor, underlies the worldview of normal people, since only through such an attitude towards life will there be a chance to hold onto the country.

Despite the fact that the ideas promoted by the party were understood by people, New Force was not registered with the Ministry of Justice. The party's official website has been blocked, its Twitter and VKontakte pages have been abandoned. This is not surprising, given the right-wing liberal position of Valery Solovy: he does not see nationalism as a threat to society, and does not consider it an ideology.

Nevertheless, Valery Solovey continues to be active. To date, he is the author and co-author of 7 books and more than 70 scientific articles, and the number of online publications and articles in the media numbers in the thousands. It has long become a tradition in the journalistic community to interview one of the most famous political scientists in the country on every more or less significant issue.

Nightingale’s frank, unvarnished notes on his own blog on the Echo of Moscow website, on his personal pages in "Facebook" And "In contact with" get a lot of comments. Quotes from speeches and the professor’s forecasts (by the way, surprisingly accurate) become the subject of discussion and are taken as the basis for expressing the personal position of concerned citizens on the pages of LiveJournal.

Personal life

All that is known about the personal life of Valery Solovy is that the professor is married and has a son, Pavel. My wife’s name is Svetlana Anashchenkova, originally from St. Petersburg, she graduated from the Faculty of Psychology of St. Petersburg State University, and is engaged in publishing children’s literature. teaching aids.

In 2009, together with his sister Tatyana, also a Doctor of Historical Sciences, Solovey published the book “The Failed Revolution. Historical meanings of Russian nationalism”, which the authors dedicated to their children - Pavel and Fedor.

Valery Solovey now

Valery Solovy’s latest book so far is “Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era” was published in 2016.

In the fall of 2017, it became known that the leader of the Growth Party, a billionaire and Commissioner for the Protection of Entrepreneurs' Rights, would participate in the Russian presidential elections in 2018. At the party's election headquarters, Valery Solovey was appointed responsible for ideology. The professor believes that from a propaganda point of view, the campaign has already been won, and the goal of Titov’s nomination is to influence economic strategy.

Among Nightingale’s latest “prophecies” are the imminent ripening of a political crisis, the loss of controllability by society, and the worsening crisis in the economy. In addition, on his Facebook page, Valery Dmitrievich expressed the opinion that we should allegedly expect the appearance of Russian volunteers in military conflicts in Yemen, as happened with Libya and Sudan. In other words, Russia will be drawn into another conflict, which will again entail multibillion-dollar expenses and rejection of the country in the international arena.

Nightingale predicts a quick end to Putin’s next presidency, in two or three years, and the reason is not even Vladimir Vladimirovich’s years (much older heads of state are in charge), but because “the people of Russia are tired of Putin.” And then a series of serious changes will follow.

Speaking about a possible successor, Solovey does not consider the Minister of Defense as such, whose candidacy is not directly, but is being discussed in narrow circles. The political scientist drew attention to Shoigu's former deputy, lieutenant general, governor of the Tula region.

On the much-discussed Ukrainian issue and the topic of the US presidential election, Valery Solovey is also straightforward. According to the political scientist, relations with Ukraine will no longer be the same, and Crimea will remain Russian. And Russia, albeit long before the elections, launched attacks, but the victory was due to a successful political strategy, exploitation of the role of the guy next door and mistakes.

Publications

• 2007 – “Meaning, logic and form of Russian revolutions”
• 2008 – “Blood and soil of Russian history”
• 2009 – “The failed revolution. Historical meanings of Russian nationalism"
• 2015 – “Absolute weapon. Fundamentals of psychological warfare and media manipulation."
• 2016 – “Revolution! Fundamentals of revolutionary struggle in the modern era"

This interview with Valery Solovy - political scientist, doctor of historical sciences, professor at MGIMO - in recent months one of the most (if not the most) accurate predictor of changes in the highest echelons of Russian power - was published on the Internet on September 24 of this year.

There is a lot of food for thought here:

– The idea of ​​early presidential elections has been discussed in the Russian political establishment since late spring of this year. The economic and social situation is getting worse, and they know it's getting worse. Because of this, it would be counterproductive to hold presidential elections in 2018, when the situation will be much worse and the mood of the masses may be completely different. As for the fact that Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin will not go to the elections, there are some reasons, I, unfortunately, cannot disclose them, for which he may not go to the elections. There is a serious reason, it is highly plausible, but I don’t know how reliable it is, we don’t know that for sure yet. Candidates for people who could replace him are already being discussed in Moscow. And some of the names were spoken, some of them create a feeling of déjà vu, yet they are discussed. There are about half a dozen of them, 6–8 people.

-Can you name them?

– I can name at least one person other than the one who creates a feeling of déjà vu. This is the Tula governor Dyumin. Although to me personally this option seems extremely implausible. But this is if Putin doesn’t go to the polls. If there really are early elections, and Vladimir Vladimirovich goes to them, I think it is very important that Mrs. Yarovaya heads the Duma Committee on Constitutional Legislation. Because then the Constitution will have to be amended, and amended quickly.

- Why?

– If we are talking about early elections, the powers of the president must be terminated early. If the president terminates his powers ahead of schedule, now, according to the law, he cannot participate in the elections. This means that changes need to be made to the law. Since Mrs. Yarovaya has done a brilliant job of passing frankly insane laws through the Duma, and at the same time enjoys the support of that irresistible force that breaks down all obstacles in and around the Duma, her proposed appointment to the post of head of the Duma Committee on Constitutional Legislation will look very eloquently.

– That is, Yarovaya is an argument in favor of the fact that it is Putin who is going to the presidential elections?

– If we are talking about early elections, when, from your point of view, are they more likely? In the spring, what did you write about in one of your posts? And when in another post you wrote about a “new window of opportunity” in a year (and this is autumn), were you writing about something else?

– If we hold early elections, it would be reasonable to do this in the spring, while everyone is in a state of groggy after the “brilliant” results of the parliamentary elections, while the opposition is morally devastated and crushed, and society is still ready to move by inertia within the framework of the electoral model that is imposed on it. And speaking of what could happen in a year, I had other circumstances in mind: a qualitatively new dynamic may emerge, but this dynamics can be laid precisely in the spring of 2017.

And further. Judging by what I know, and here my assessments are based not on speculative guesses, but on the opinions of people much more knowledgeable than me, the situation in the economy is quite bad. It is worse than we think, and the economy’s margin of safety may be exhausted just in time for the fall of next year. This is not a question of the Reserve Fund running out, these are other problems.

And third: the restructuring of public administration, which is now actually beginning to be implemented, does not lead to increased efficiency, but to disorganization. This is clearly seen in the history of the Russian Guard and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is no de facto guard yet, it exists rather de jure, and the capacity of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has sharply decreased. If the planned personnel changes begin to be carried out at least halfway, we will see disorganization of the entire apparatus of power from top to bottom. Russia is structured in such a way that if bosses change, then all their subordinates begin to change. Therefore, in the fall of 2017 we can see some qualitatively new dynamics, some of its intermediate results.

– A few days ago, official information appeared that more than 14 billion rubles were allocated for the presidential elections in the 2017 budget, not 2018. The authorities are not hiding that this will happen in 2017?

– Preparation of the budget began on the eve of summer, and then rumors began to circulate about early presidential elections, the decision on which should be made based on the results of the parliamentary elections. I am not an expert on the budget process, maybe it should be so that funds should be allocated in 2017 to prepare for the 2018 elections. But it is possible that we are talking specifically about the elections in 2017. (The New Times proves that “money is not budgeted in advance - but precisely for the year when it must be spent.” - Note.)

– We need to discuss the nature of your predictions. You have a humorous post on Facebook: “Friends from the administration called to congratulate. They asked to continue to keep them informed about what was happening in the country. Reluctantly promised.” It seems that you are directly talking about the nature of awareness. Putin administration long years was famous for its absolute secrecy. Now we see information emerging. It may be strange, one-sided, but it appears. Is this change due to the fact that the government has broken up into factions, and they feel free enough to voice their picture of what is happening?

– In my opinion, internal tension has increased greatly due to strong external pressure. By external pressure, I do not mean only relations between Russia and the West, although this is an extremely important factor for the self-perception and personal strategies of high-ranking representatives of the Russian elite, both political and financial-economic. Those at the top who remain sober understand perfectly well that we are not moving from victory to victory, but from bad to worse. And in times of crisis, the struggle for dwindling resources is intensifying. When all this comes together - increasing tension, the struggle for resources - then, naturally, information begins to come out. Many people are simply no longer able to remain silent; they blurt out how bad they feel, how difficult and joyless everything is. In addition, information begins to be used to combat real and potential opponents, to prevent any personnel changes, to defame certain people. For example, the attack on Igor Shuvalov was caused by the fact that he was considered a likely contender for the post of prime minister. At least he considered himself that way. And now to loud scandals, especially those associated with personal immodesty, the highest official of the state treats very carefully. The second example is the attacks on Igor Sechin. His very influential opponents (I can say that one of them is vying for the post of prime minister) wanted to curb the appetites of Igor Ivanovich and his corporation. Or, for example, relatively recent information attacks on the current prime minister, behind which there was a high-ranking official. Information begins to go beyond this narrow circle, circulate - and becomes available to an increasing number of people. There is nothing in what I say and write that is not known to all those in Moscow who are professionally interested in politics. But this information needs to be analyzed and systematized, and its reliability assessed.

– This information comes from different directions, often it is unverifiable.

– Therefore, I consider it a very good result for myself if I am right in 50 percent of cases. This is almost accurate weather forecasting, at least in Russia. This is a brilliant indicator (laughs)! Perhaps it's just that I share my thoughts on Facebook, but others don't. I am by no means the only one who can tell you about the future with such accuracy.

– You mentioned the attack on Shuvalov, Navalny wrote about Shuvalov, that is, you accused Navalny of working for...?

– No, I think in this case everything is more complicated. Alexey Anatolyevich Navalny thinks like a politician - he has very serious political ambitions, and not without reason - and reasonably believes that the dissemination of such information is, among other things, in his interests. For any opposition - in Russia or in another country - chaos in the elite is beneficial. And it is especially beneficial in those countries where the opposition cannot actually participate in the legal political process, its electoral chances are insignificant or they are not allowed to be realized. So there is nothing surprising in Navalny’s information activity.

– Let’s talk about the reshuffles that are currently being carried out on a large scale. We see a long list of candidates for reshuffles. By the way, you have the security forces and other groups opposing them, but it feels like there are many different groups within the security forces. Do you have a sense of the integrity of what is happening or is this a war of all against all? Is there a common logic behind the wave of personnel decisions?

– There is logic in it, which does not mean that the rearrangements are carried out according to some harmonious plan. Remember how in War and Peace Tolstoy describes the disposition developed by the Austrian general, and how the troops then act according to their own understanding? The logic is as follows: the highest authorities have a very clear feeling that something needs to be done. What? She cannot compromise with the West - this would mean, from her point of view, serious reputational damage. She does not want to carry out institutional reforms in the economy. And so she is trying, as it seems to her, to update the system of public administration in order to give dynamics to all spheres of life. As Karamzin once wrote, Russia does not need a constitution, Russia needs 50 smart and honest governors. This means we will find smart and honest civil servants, including governors. Where do you get the footage from? It’s clear that the staff is sourced from where people are very trusted. And this, if we talk about the security forces, strengthens not so much the FSB as the Federal Security Service and the Presidential Security Service, which have a rather serious conflict with Federal service security. And the FSB is very afraid that the new head of the service may come from a competing department. The Ministry of Internal Affairs now fears the same thing. Moreover, now in all those law enforcement agencies that have their own security services, including the Prosecutor's Office, the Investigative Committee, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, they will be headed and staffed by people from the FSB, which also means tension within the security corporation. Where it leads? Definitely not to increase the efficiency of the device. This already leads to its disorganization, to the fact that established communications are broken. What quality they were is another question, but they were there, they worked. These communications are torn, new ones are not built, because it takes time to build them. Nervousness grows, everyone looks at each other with distrust, and even hatred. So the general logic is the logic of maintaining and surviving power and in power, nothing more. This is not a logic aimed at carrying out what we might call modernization, economic and political reforms.

– If we look at your list of predictions: Medvedev “for promotion”, security official for prime minister, Kudrin “crossed out”, Volodin for the Duma, Naryshkin for the Foreign Intelligence Service and so on - can we say that the logic of these appointments is based on the fact that in 2017 Will Putin be replaced by Medvedev?

– (Laughs.) And this is also possible. Remember how it was in 2007 - before handing over the presidential administration to a replacement, Vladimir Vladimirovich placed in key positions - deputy ministers and the like - people from the corporation to which he professionally belonged. So you can characterize it this way. You see, we are not even dealing with facts yet, we are mainly discussing assumptions. From these assumptions we can build any concept, the most sophisticated conspiracy theory, but there is no guarantee that it will turn out to be correct. This can be perceived both as the creation of a safety net in case a new presidential candidate appears from the government, and simply as an increase in the efficiency of the apparatus, an increase in loyalty, an attempt to dynamize the apparatus, what young people call “movement.” Some kind of “movement” will appear, and lazy fat cats will start catching mice.

– The current elections, you write, have shown that the opposition has suffered a fiasco and cannot come to power by legal means, but it has “other ways.” In addition, surprisingly, after these elections, we see dissatisfied statements from pro-Putin people in the public sphere; they are dissatisfied with the way the elections were conducted. There is a feeling that there are people dissatisfied with the elections at all levels. Does this create a revolutionary situation?

– This does not create a revolutionary situation, it simply expresses the growing misunderstanding, irritation and confusion in all layers of society, from bottom to top. Nobody understands where we are going. Russia now very much resembles a ship without a rudder or sails. What are our goals, what is the strategy, what are we achieving – it is not clear. The vast majority of people have a persistent feeling of deterioration, which is already very serious, and which will last for a long time; they do not see the future. It is enough to read the official forecasts of government departments, and it becomes clear: they expect that the crisis and recession will last at least another three to four years. And people think in horror: how will we live? Our real incomes are decreasing every year! This has not yet resulted in any radical political and social behavior. Well, we see isolated flashes - an attempt by tractor drivers to march on Moscow.

– Farmers meet with Putin.

– And this is a very correct step from the point of view of the authorities. This should have been done earlier, not to disperse them, not to hinder them, but to provide them with a meeting, if not with Putin, then with someone else in order to calm them down. Another thing is that these specific ones can be calmed down, but there is no money in the country to fill all such problems with them all the time. Therefore, discontent will grow. It now looks very much like smoldering peat: everything seems to be fine, everything has adapted, but this is not the case. It's not what it seems. There is a not very visible, but serious change in public consciousness. And sociologists know this and record these changes. They foresee that the changes will be of a qualitative nature. But no one can answer the question of when these changes result in new social behavior and what this social behavior will be like. The only time-bound forecasts I saw from sociologists pointed to a turning point in 2017. mass consciousness. But it does not follow from this that this will be a turning point in political and social behavior. We discussed that there is tension and conflicts in the elite, but these conflicts can only become a split if the elite feels massive pressure from below. As soon as we see that unrest and social protests are taking over several regions of Russia - simultaneously or sequentially, it doesn’t matter - we will immediately notice that the elite has some kind of independent political position, different from the position of the supreme power. This is the normal logic of all political changes in the world, if you do not take such extreme forms as military rebellion and coup d'etat, to which Russia will not reach. In our country, changes will occur according to the classical scenario, if they occur.

– And what is this classic scenario?

– The classic scenario is very simple. Unexpectedly for everyone - and this always happens unexpectedly - the social level in society rises, protests begin - most likely, first in the provinces, in industrial regions, because in Moscow everything is cemented, the opposition is openly afraid, and it has grounds afraid. Unrest begins, and the people who will take to the streets - workers, tractor drivers, drivers, combine operators - cannot be accused of being a “fifth column” operating with money from the State Department. After this - political speeches in large cities, primarily in the capitals, in Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the same time, there is hesitation among the elite, which is beginning to think about extending its hand to the people. And then it turns out that some groups of the elite have always been with the people, have always been democrats, always wanted changes and fought to prevent things from getting worse. This is a classic scenario.

– When you talked about the script, that on elections are underway not Putin, but Medvedev, you didn’t mean that the highest authorities in Russia understand the situation exactly as you describe it, and are preparing to somehow prevent it? You meant that these were some personal decisions of Vladimir Putin?

– Yes, it has a slightly different motivation. But the factor I'm talking about is always taken into account. The authorities are very interested in the mood of the masses, they are afraid of mass protests, they have learned from the experience of the end of 2011 - beginning of 2012, when these protests began unexpectedly for everyone, like a jack-in-the-box. And there is one more important circumstance: in order to keep the economy afloat in Russia, not to mention to ensure at least some minimal development, it is critically important to lift the sanctions regime or at least seriously weaken it. But the current government in Russia cannot negotiate this with the West, as everyone in Russia and the West knows well. Accordingly, another government is needed, formally different, which could take the initiative to defuse tensions in Russian-American relations, which are now, judging by the events in Syria, moving towards a very dangerous point. Someone needs to unblock the situation, or we will move along the path of further escalation, if not military, then verbal, political and strategic, and this will simply undermine our economy. Russia is not strong enough to allow itself to compete with the West in the economic and military-strategic sphere.

– Tell us about your new book and about the revolution. What does your book have to do with the situation in Russia?

– My book is called “Revolution! Fundamentals of the revolutionary struggle in the modern era” and the genre is historical and sociological in nature, not historical. I write about revolutions in general. But I am primarily interested in the experience of the so-called “color” revolutions that have taken place over the past ten years, and I am especially interested in the post-Soviet space. I also interpret the Russian experience of 2011–12 as an attempt at revolution, which the authorities successfully stopped, in contrast to the revolutions in Ukraine and some other post-Soviet and not only post-Soviet countries. I pose the question of whether it is possible to predict a revolution at all. Based on what I know, and what everyone who has studied revolutions writes, not a single revolution was predicted anywhere or by anyone; all revolutions always began unexpectedly. I analyze like any person who is interested Russian politics and history, risk factors that exist now in Russia. I believe that we do not fully understand what the main risk factor is.

- What?

– It lies in the fact that Russia itself began a new dynamic in 2014. Everything connected with Ukraine and Crimea was the beginning of a new dynamic. By the end of 2013, the situation in Russia was absolutely cemented. However, very often crises begin not due to external and internal pressure, but due to the actions of the authorities themselves. Power that has no challenges loses its sense of self-preservation. What started in 2014 was happening in the realm of geopolitics, but the system is designed in such a way that if you start to dynamize one part of it, you inevitably turn on the dynamics for other parts of the system. And this is also a classic of the changes taking place in the world. Soviet Union collapsed not due to the fact that the West won, it collapsed as a result of the dynamics that were started in the Soviet Union itself. If we look at world history, we will see that in certain countries reforms or military expansion began in order to strengthen the regime, give it a new breath, but it all ended with the regime being destroyed. But we'll only see it when and if it starts to unfold. Moreover, the beginning of political changes can happen so quickly that we, say, go to bed in one country, and wake up in a completely different one.

– We were taught that there is a certain driving force of the revolution: the working class, or not the working class, but there must be some kind of class. Who could it be? Are these tractor drivers, miners? Who are these people?

– The peculiarity of modern revolutions is that they do not have a hegemonic class, there is not even a political hegemon. Situational protest coalitions arise in them, and thanks to social networks, the Internet - why the authorities are so afraid of social networks and the Internet - these coalitions arise rapidly. If you look at Egypt's Lotus Revolution, you'll see that Westernized students demanding democratization and Muslim Brotherhood supporters stood side by side in Tahrir Square. Or what we saw on the Kiev Maidan. Situational protest coalitions arise very quickly, because between these political and ideological clusters, if not cooperation, then communication on the Internet and in social networks. Studies of the Russian social blogosphere have shown a very interesting thing: we have political and ideological clusters that are seemingly opposite - nationalists, liberals, leftists - unlike other countries, they intensively communicate and cooperate. They do not close themselves off in their own ghettos. That is, the cultural and communication basis for such a protest coalition already exists. It’s just that several circumstances need to come together, and we will see this coalition; it will emerge very quickly. Moreover, a coalition of this kind always acts under the slogan “We want justice.” The coalition participants put their own content into this concept, but they have the same slogan: “Justice!” And their second slogan: “The government is unjust, so it must be overthrown or changed.” This is the whole ideology of the revolution. This is exactly what has happened for the last 15–20 years. No party of a new or latest type, no advanced class is simply needed.

– There is an important amendment here. In 2014, after Crimea, Russian nationalists moved to another trench, and the parapets of the trenches are so high that it is difficult to imagine that they will again unite with liberals in the fight against the regime of Vladimir Putin. Do you insist that the new coalition can include nationalists, liberals, and democrats?

– And the left, and environmentalists, and animal defenders... The issue of Crimea, the issue of Ukraine is now of third importance for Russian political discourse. They are not on the top agenda of Russian society. You can turn Crimea into an insurmountable obstacle, or you can put it out of the picture by saying: we have more important problems, and when we solve the important problems, we will deal with everything else. What PARNAS did by including the nationalist Maltsev just indicates that such a coalition can work. Was the issue of Crimea even part of the parliamentary campaign? No. Was there a question about the attitude towards the war in Ukraine and Donbass? Nothing like this. Society no longer cares about this. He has other problems, and these problems are described in one word - justice. To Russian society Justice is sorely lacking. It is not enough, for example, for those who are engaged in business, they believe that they are unfairly offended, they are under strong administrative, fiscal and non-legal pressure. Any group can say about itself that it is unfairly offended. Crimea and Ukraine do not and will not in the future have any significance for the Russian political agenda.

– For a successful revolution, in addition to actions from below, there must be a part of the elite ready to go over to the side of the protesters. You say that Kudrin has been “crossed out,” but the economic bloc of the government is still with the liberals. That is, the notorious “system liberals” do not have political weight, but perhaps they are betting on Medvedev’s promotion - this is all such idle reasoning. It cannot be that all these leaks that have appeared that we are talking about are just an attempt by some part of the elite to let it be known somewhere outside that, in principle, there is someone in the elite who is ready at some point support something?

– No, it would be too strategically difficult for them. They think exclusively in group categories, although they may have some kind of implicit ideology. But this implicit ideology - systemic liberals, security forces - will become explicit in a situation of increasing social suppression. The elite splits when it sees pressure from below and performs a rational choice operation: why should I drown with the regime if I can extend my hand to the rebellious people (let's call it that)? And then the competition begins to see who can extend their hand first! Which elite group will be successful is difficult to say, it depends on the circumstances. But I can say that no one will particularly resist. The ability of the Russian ruling elite and the regime in general to resist should not be exaggerated. He tries to give the impression of being very tough, brutal, ready for anything, and he succeeds. However, our government is not a granite rock, not a monolith, it is spongy Swiss cheese. She simply had not yet encountered serious pressure from below, she had not yet encountered even not very serious pressure from below. As soon as it collides, we will see the cheese begin to crumble.

– At one time you described yourself as “a nationalist in the best sense of the word,” a liberal and a democrat. There are people in power who communicate with you, and we can assume that people usually communicate with those who are close to them in some sense. If we imagine that some part of the elite will support the actions from below, who will it be - nationalists in the best sense, liberals, democrats, someone else?

– I think that, most likely, they will be technocrats. In Russia there is a considerable technocratic layer in power. It is not very noticeable, because these people do not shine, they prefer not to be public, but they are very influential. As a rule, these are people with the rank of deputy ministers. And some ministers too. These are people who understand that the problems facing the country must be solved not based on ideologies, but on common sense and economic logic. In Russia it is necessary to ensure economic development, it is necessary to restore social subsystems. This is not about health care and education reform, but about restoring their normal activities. It is necessary to restore the efficiency of the administrative apparatus. And we need to create a working one legal system. These are large-scale, but technocratic tasks; they do not imply any ideological background. We are not saying that we want to change the form of ownership, that we want to return revolutionary expediency and proletarian legality to the place of a formally functioning judicial system. In Russia there are certain shells of institutions, they need to be filled with working content. Even in the case of the most large-scale changes, we are not talking about a social revolution. What happened in 1917 will not happen. There will be no large-scale redistribution of property, nor civil war. The energy potential in society is too low for it to go to some kind of war. We will have to solve the problems of survival and development, acting outside of ideological paradigms. As for the ideology of protest, any call to society from the protest coalition will be populist. There is no need to be afraid of this, this is the norm in all countries where such changes began.

– And this hypothetical person - a successor who will be formulated within the government, or a person brought by this pressure group from below - the elite of technocrats should accept him, and he will be their ideological cover?